Four years later, and no end in sight.
Feb. 24 of 2026 marked the fourth anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. What some may have believed to be a quick and decisive conflict has extended to become the deadliest European war since World War II. The Center for Strategic and International Studies estimated in January that the casualties from this conflict could reach 2 million by spring of this year, and while the U.S., Ukraine, and Russia are now holding trilateral talks for the first time, political analysts conclude there is still no foreseeable end to the fighting given where the diplomatic positions of each side still stand. It is valuable, then, to understand how the invasion has arrived at this grim point, as well as what the current state of the conflict looks like, in order to fully comprehend its scale and magnitude.
In the early hours on the morning of Feb. 24, 2022, President Vladimir Putin announced a “special military operation” in Ukraine. Shortly thereafter he launched rockets at major Ukrainian cities and ordered troops over the Russo-Ukrainian border in an attempt to seize a quick victory. President Putin intended for this “operation” to last only a few weeks. However, the fierce resistance encountered in Ukraine closed this window of opportunity for him relatively quickly. In response to Russia’s invasion, President Volodymyr Zelensky immediately decreed a full military mobilization of the country, and by late March, Russia began scaling back its military operations around the Ukrainian capital city of Kyiv. The intense resistance and subsequent failed offensive around Kyiv marked a major shift in Putin’s outlook on the war, with there no longer being an assurance of quick victory for Russia.
Around the same time as military operations were being scaled back around the capital city, Russia’s defence minister abruptly stated that their “main efforts” were now focused on “the liberation of Donbas” rather than the full demilitarization of Ukraine. This realignment of Moscow’s goals was accompanied by a strengthening of Russia’s military positions in southern and eastern Ukraine, as well as President Putin formally — and illegally — annexing four occupied territories in September. By December, the Russian president was admitting to members of his personal human rights council that operations in Ukraine could become a “long-term process.” While Putin may have begun the invasion hoping for a rapid and complete victory, by the end of 2022 both sides were reluctantly adjusting for a long conflict ahead.
The international community did not remain silent on the Russian invasion and provided Ukraine with both military and diplomatic assistance throughout 2023. Western nations in particular took an interest in Ukraine’s defense and increased support for the escalating Ukrainian resistance against Russia. Prime Minister Rishi Sunak confirmed in January that the U.K. would be sending Challenger 2 tanks, and in August, both Denmark and the Netherlands, with U.S. approval, began sending F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine. The invasion also began to spark fears in other nations surrounding Russia for their sovereignty. Subsequently, in 2023 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) saw renewed expansion, culminating in Finland becoming the 31st member of the alliance in April, and continued efforts to allow Sweden to join over the course of the year. President Putin also sought outside support throughout the year, hosting a summit with Kim Jong-un in September to discuss a possible supply deal with North Korea.
The international efforts to end the invasion diplomatically over the span of the year largely resulted in very little. China’s continued urging of both sides to enter peace negotiations was not acted upon, and a peace mission by seven African leaders to Kyiv and Russia in June ended without any visible progress. These failed diplomatic attempts to draw down the conflict, as well as the previously mentioned armament of Ukraine, display how the war continued to expand in 2023 while any negotiated settlement to the conflict remained elusive.
With there being no foreseeable diplomatic solution, the sides began to escalate military action. In early June, Ukraine launched a counteroffensive with the goal of retaking Russian-occupied territory in the south and east. However, though militarily assisted and supplied by other nations, the counteroffensive largely stalled by November without having fully achieved its objectives. The fighting had become a grueling and incremental affair, requiring an ever-increasing stream of new soldiers and weapons to replenish draining supplies of both. Therefore, in July, Russia raised the maximum age of conscription for men from 27 to 30. Additionally, Ukraine continued to seek out military supplies from countries like the U.S. and Slovakia throughout the year. Altogether, the conflict in 2023 was defined by its increasing scope, with international actors playing a heavier role, and the shift into a prolonged war of attrition that necessitated rising streams of manpower and weapons.
By 2024, the conflict was fully settled into the enduring war it is today, with both sides preparing for its continuation rather than any near-term diplomatic settlement. Western nations continued to support Ukraine’s resistance, and on the 27th of June, the European Union signed a security agreement with Ukraine that accepted “joint security commitments” between both parties. The trend of NATO expansion persisted over the course of 2024 as well, and in March, Sweden became the 32nd member-state of the alliance. Alongside this, Russia also took efforts to solidify its posture, electing Putin to a fifth term in office and making him the longest reigning Russian leader since Joseph Stalin. Militarily, 2024 saw a renewed attempt by Ukraine to expand the conflict’s scope. Launching an offensive directly into Russian territory in August. However, similar to the 2023 counteroffensive, by early October the advance had stalled and Russia was still no closer to being brought to the table for peace talks. And in November, Donald Trump was elected to the U.S. presidency, initiating a readjustment of America’s values in Ukraine and setting the stage for the current outlook of the conflict.
The current state of the conflict is still unresolved with the diplomatic positions of both sides being too distant from each other for any compromise settlement to take form. Throughout the war, it has been the civilians on the ground who have had to pay the price for this. As stated previously, the casualties from this conflict could reach up to 2 million by later this spring with many of those casualties being civilians completely uninvolved with the conflict. The civilian economy of the region has also suffered greatly from the labor shortages, interest hikes and destruction to infrastructure that have occurred with Russia’s invasion. In general, the living situation in the conflict-zone for civilians has been severely degraded by the war, and with no end to the fighting in sight, circumstances are unlikely to improve for the millions living in the region. Furthermore, the incremental nature of the conflict has persisted, with the Center for Strategic and International Studies reporting that since 2024, Russian forces have advanced at an average rate of 15-70 square meters per day, “slower than almost any major offensive campaign in any war in the last century.”
Despite this factor remaining consistent, the election of Trump has shifted the international dynamics of this war. Since taking office, Trump has gone back and forth on the degree to which America will support Ukraine, infamously arguing with President Zelensky in front of the press in the Oval Office and most recently threatening to end weapons shipments if Europe continues to refuse engagement with his war in Iran. And though the U.S., Ukraine and Russia are now holding trilateral talks for the first time, political analysts have yet to find a foreseeable end to the conflict without major developments.
For a more detailed timeline on the four-year war, visit: https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9847/CBP-9847.pdf
